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COMMENTS
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
RESPONSE TO THE BRAZILIAN DEBT
CRISIS: WHETHER THE EFFECTS
OF CONDITIONALITY HAVE
UNDERMINED BRAZIL'S NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY?
INTRODUCTION
The Third World Debt Crisis' of the 1980's has adversely
affected the economies of the developing and developed nation-
states. It has become a permanent fixture of the present day
international political economy rather than just a passing cri-
sis. International political economists now speak in terms of
debt management and long term debt restructuring. The inter-
national financial system must now attempt to manage a Third
World debt that had reached 1.15 trillion dollars in 1988 and
has not diminished significantly since then.2 Brazil is the larg-
est indebted Third World country with approximately 111 bil-
lion dollars of foreign debt.3 Such a massive amount of foreign
debt places inordinate strains on Brazilian socio-economic de-
velopment. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the
principal multinational organization that has played, and will
play for decades to come, a substantial role in managing the in-
ternational and intranational conflicts caused by the Third
1 JOHN CHARLES POOLE & STEVE STAMOS, THE ABCs OF INTERNATIONAL Fi-
NANCE 85 (1987). See Chapter six that specifically analyzes the Third World Debt
Crisis.
2 Eul-Soo Pang, Debt Adjustment, and Democratic Cacophony in Brazil, in
DEBT AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 128 (Barbara Stallings and Robert Kauf-
man eds., 1989).
3 WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 245 (1991).
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World Debt Crisis.4 As a result, the IMF has instituted various
austerity and debt restructuring programs for Brazil through-
out the 1980's.5 However, these austerity programs have rigid
conditionality requirements that nation-states must adopt
before the IMF will extend financial assistance to a particular
country.6 Consequently, the IMF's political-economic influence
over the domestic policy implementations of Brazil has in-
creased substantially during the 1980's.
This comment examines whether or not it is an ultra vires7
act of international law for the IMF to exercise financial, eco-
nomic, and ultimately social policy leverage over Brazil's do-
mestic affairs. The comment will primarily discuss the IMF's
conditionality requirements and if they have undermined Bra-
zil's national sovereignty, thus violating a basic principle of in-
ternational law and nation-state identity. Part I briefly
discusses why and how Brazil accumulated a 118 billion dollar
foreign debt. This is necessary to fully understand why and
how the IMF became so integrally involved with Brazil. Part II
examines the institutional framework of the IMF and its condi-
tionality policies. Part III addresses IMF conditionality and
Brazil's national sovereignty. An extensive definition of sover-
eignty is also discussed in Part III. Part IV specifically exam-
ines the IMF conditionality policies and if they have
undermined Brazil's sovereignty. Part V offers possible solu-
tions to Brazil's foreign debt problems and Part VI offers some
concluding thoughts.
4 Manuel Pastor, Jr., Latin America, the Debt Crisis, and the International
Monetary Fund, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES GLOBAL
POWER AND WEALTH 320 (Jeffry A. Frieden & David A. Lake eds., 2d ed. 1991).
5 Pang, supra note 2, at 128.
6 Samual Lichtensztejn, IMF-Developing Countries: Conditionality and
Strategy, in ITMF CoNDIroNAL TY 209-210 (John Williamson ed., 1984).
7 Ultra vires is defined as "an act performed without any authority to act on
[the] subject." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1522 (6th ed. 1990).
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I. THE DOMESTIC AND EXOGENOUS FACTORS OF BRAZIL'S
FOREIGN DEBT ACCUMULATION IN THE 1970's AND EARLY
1980's
A. The Domestic Factors
Although the international community often refers to the
exogenous causes of the Third World Debt Crisis, Brazil had a
number of domestic factors that fostered its foreign indebted-
ness. In part, Brazil's foreign debt can be linked to the political-
economic policies of Brazil's authoritarian-military govern-
ments.8 The authoritarian-military governments controlled
Brazil from 1964 to 1985. These authoritarian-military govern-
ments were headed by several Brazilian Presidents who were
not democratically elected by the Brazilian people, but were
placed into power through the force of the Brazilian military.9
One question the new military regimes faced was what type of
economic development did they want Brazil to pursue.
The main thrust of the military regimes' economic policy
was to rely less on the exportation of primary goods and to pur-
sue economic growth by facilitating the production of more
manufactured goods, such as consumer durable goods, for the
domestic and foreign markets.10 In order to have export led
growth, Brazil had to modernize its industrial base and build a
comprehensive infrastructure which could support this indus-
trialization. The military regimes invested billions of dollars in
8 THoMAs E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 175(2d
ed. 1989). These authoritarian regimes were made up of coalitions of military of-
ficers, technocratic administrators, and old-line politicians. This alliance was
formed in the early 1960's as a response to the populist government of President
Goulart. The origins of the alliance are found in the concerns of the wealthy elite
class and the right wing military establishment that saw the populist government
of President Goulart as moving Brazil toward a socialist or communist political
and economic structure. Goulart mobilized peasants as well as workers in what
seemed to be a worker-peasant movement against the socioeconomic establish-
ment. As a result, General Castelo Branco successfully staged a military coup in
1964 with the backing of the alliance. Id. at 173-176. See chapter five of MODERN
LATIN AMERICA for an in depth analysis of Brazil's political, economic, and social
development since it gained independence from Portugal in 1822.
9 THOMAs E. SKIDMORE, THE PoLrIcs OF MILITARY RuLE IN BRAZIL 1964-
1985 6 (1988). Specifically, under the military rule, the Brazilian President would
come into power by being designated by the Brazilian Army Officer Corps for "elec-
tion" by Brazil's Congress. Id.
10 CHRIs C. CARvouNIs, THE DEBT DILEMMA OF DEvELOPING NATIONS 119
(1984).
025
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state owned industrial corporations-parastatals" in energy,
steel, telecommunications, transportation, mining, and agricul-
ture.12 But this type of industrialization process required im-
mense amounts of capital and sophisticated technologies that
Brazil did not have.13 Indeed, "[g]rowth in developing economies
often requires the import of capital equipment and. materials
necessary for new and ongoing industries."14 Unfortunately,
much of the parastatals' growth was financed with billions of
dollars of capital borrowed from the foreign banking institu-
tions of the developed countries. 15 By 1981 Brazil's parastatals
accounted for 32.2 billion dollars in foreign debt which was 46%
of Brazil's total foreign debt in 1981.16 Brazil relied on bor-
rowed foreign capital from the commercial banking institutions
of the developed countries of the North because Brazilians have
historically associated direct foreign investment with the pro-
cess of "denationalization or foreign control of their economy 17
Second, the authoritarian-military governments also reor-
ganized Brazil's financial institutions in order to finance Bra-
zil's debt financed industrialization.'i  In the years following
the 1964 military coup, the authoritarian governments re-
vamped Brazil's financial sector so as to "institutionalize the
role of the financial sector in the investment process."19 In other
11 Jeffry Frieden, The Brazilian Borrowing Experience, LArIN AMEICAN RE-
SEARCH REVIEW 99 (1988). Brazil's state owned and state managed industries are
often referred to as "parastatals." See Aldo C. Vacs, Politics Of The Foreign Debt:
Argentina, Brazil: The International Debt Crisis (1986) (unpublished Ph.D disser-
tation, University of Pittsburgh). Currently, Aldo C. Vacs is a tenured Professor of
Government at Skidmore College in Saratoga Springs, New York. Specifically, he
specializes in the teaching of and the writing on the political, economic, and social
history and current state of developing countries, especially those of Latin
America.
12 Id. at 99-108. When the military took over in 1964 there were a total of 180
public firms. However, their number grew to 646 by 1985. Consequently, of the
Fortune 500 international corporations, seven are Brazilian. Five of these are the
Brazilian state owned firms of Petrobras (oil), Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (iron
ore), and Siderbras, Usiminas, and Cosipa (all steel manufacturers). Pang, supra
note 2, at 129.
13 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PEOPLE, LONG SHADOW OF GLOBAL DEBT 185,
189 (1986).
14 Id.
15 Frieden, supra note 11, at 104.
16 Frieden, supra note 11, at 104.
17 Pang, supra note 2, at 128.
18 Frieden, supra note 11, at 98-99.
19 Frieden, supra note 11, at 98.
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words, the Brazilian financial system was reorganized so as to
resemble and operate just as the banking institutions of the
United States. Moreover, the authoritarian governments also
passed new banking laws, such as statute 413120 and Resolu-
tion 63,21 that allowed Brazilian state and private firms to bor-
row directly from foreign banks. Additionally, the
authoritarian governments enacted Aviso GB-588 22 which pro-
vided state guarantees for public and private companies that
borrowed money from foreign banking institutions. In brief,
this reorganization of the Brazilian financial sector made for-
eign borrowed capital more accessible for Brazil's parastatals
and private industries, and integrated the Brazilian banking
system into the international banking network of the developed
countries. 23
B. The External Factors
Brazil's 111 billion dollar foreign debt can also be attrib-
uted to factors outside the domestic sphere of influences. The
origins of Brazil's Debt Crisis also stem from autonomous exog-
enous factors. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 were two signifi-
cant external factors that facilitated Brazil's foreign
indebtedness. 24 Both oil shocks resulted from the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) constriction of their
oil production levels.25 By cutting their oil production and thus
world wide oil supplies, crude oil prices rose as demand re-
mained at pre-shock levels in the developed and developing
20 Pang, supra note 2, at 128.
21 Pang, supra note 2, at 128.
22 Pang, supra note 2, at 128. Aviso GB-588 empowered Bank of Brazil to
meet all the obligations of private and public industries with the guarantee from
the national treasury or from any other official-state backed financial institution.
23 Frieden, supra note 11, at 102. Generally, the authoritarian military gov-
ernments also provided for incentives to borrow capital from abroad. Incentives
ranged from exemptions from certain financial taxes or quantitative credit con-
trols, to an exchange-rate policy that rewarded foreign borrowers, to an increase in
domestic interest rates to push Brazilian industries to borrow abroad at lower real
interest rates. Frieden, supra note 9 at 102. See Jeffry A. Frieden, The Brazilian
Borrowing Experience, LATIN AMERiCAN RESEARCH REvIEw 102-104 (1988) for a
more extensive analysis of the reorganization of the Brazilian financial sector
under the auspices of the military regimes in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
24 POOLE & STAmos, supra note 1, at 87-89.
25 JOAN EDELMAN SPERO, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA-
TIONS 265-277 (4th ed. 1990).
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countries. 26 Since Brazil is classified as a non-oil-exporting de-
veloping country, Brazil has to import a substantial portion of
its oil from the Middle East.27 The oil shock of 1973 raised the
price of oil from two dollars a barrel to more than eleven dollars
per barrel. 28 Thus, Brazil's oil bill doubled and Brazil borrowed
billions of dollars to import the same amount of oil they had
bought before 1973.29 The second oil shock of 1979 raised the
price of oil from thirteen dollars a barrel in 1978 to approxi-
mately forty one dollars by mid 1980.30 As a result, Brazil had
to make 38.27 billion dollars in oil payments between 1974 and
1981.31
Further, since OPEC had hundreds of billions of dollars in
new oil revenue, OPEC "began salting [investing] away a large
percentage of their dollar holdings in the safe haven of Euro-
pean and U.S. banks."3 2 Consequently, in the 1970's, capital be-
came readily available for loan to the Third World at low
interest rates and with none of the IMF conditionality require-
ments. It follows that Brazil eagerly took advantage of this sit-
uation and only borrowed capital from the newly-endowed
banks in the United States and Western Europe.3 3
Equally important, was the shift in U.S. Federal Reserve
policy in the latter half of 1979. The new policy was to combat
inflation with a tight monetary policy, and thus the Federal Re-
serve raised the U.S. prime lending rate to 18.8% by the end of
1981.34 Since Brazil contracted nearly two-thirds of its foreign
26 PETER NUNNENKAMP, THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS OF THE THIRD
WORLD 60 (1986).
27 NuNNEmcAmP, supra note 26, at 51-59.
28 SPERO, supra note 25, at 266-277.
29 SPERO, supra note 25, at 275-76.
30 SPERO, supra note 25, at 275-76.
31 NuNNENKAMp, supra note 26, at 60.
32 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 13, at 189.
33 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 13, at 189. What occurred in
the 1970's with the OPEC nation-states investing hundreds of billions of dollar
holdings in U.S. and Western European banks is often referred to as "recycling of
petrodollars." Since there was a severe recession in the Western countries, loan
demand from the developed countries was insufficient to absorb or recycle the
OPEC petrodollars that were deposited in U.S. and Western European banks. As
a result, international bankers turned to the Third World borrowers who needed
capital to finance industrialization, massive infrastructure projects, and to pay for
rising oil bills. Id. at 189-190.
34 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, U.S. ECONOMIC DATA (1973-1985).
The notion behind restricting the money supply was to slow the amount of cur-
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borrowing with variable interest rates3 5 that fluctuated with
the change in the U.S. prime lending rate, Brazil's interest pay-
ments on its foreign debt substantially increased. Indeed, be-
cause these high interest rates came at a time when inflation
was starting to abate, one result was higher real interest rates
for Third World borrowers such as Brazil.36 In 1981, the inter-
est alone accounted for 9.6 billion dollars of Brazil's foreign
debt.37
By late 1982, Brazil could no longer keep up with its
mounting principle and variable interest rate obligations. The
real trigger of the Third World Debt Crisis was Mexico's an-
nouncement in August 1982 of its inability to service (make in-
stallment payments) its 85 billion dollar foreign debt.38
Consequently, bank lending to developing countries abruptly
halted after Mexico's 1982 suspension of its debt servicing.39
Mexico's shock to the confidence of the international banking
community thus precipitated a drying up of new lending to Bra-
zil.40 Without new lending, Brazil was forced to turn to the IMF
for capital lending that was essential to Brazil's continued abil-
ity to pay its foreign creditors and to maintain a source of fi-
nancing for its economic development.41 As a result, Brazil and
the IMF negotiated a settlement where Brazil was to adopt IMF
"austerity programs," which were implemented under the aus-
pices of the traditional IMF conditionality requirements. 42 The
rency that was being injected into the United States economy. With a decreased
money supply, the velocity of money would gradually decrease and thus inflation-
ary pressures would slow.
35 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 253 (1991).
36 POOLE & STAMos, supra note 1, at 91. Throughout much of the 1970's the
cost of borrowing capital from the banking system of the industrialized countries
proved to be quite inexpensive. With inflation running at extremely high levels,
the real cost of borrowing capital from foreign banks was lowered. A foreign loan
contracted at an eight percent interest rate would only cost a borrower two percent
in real terms if there was a six percent inflation rate for that particular year. In
many instances, the inflation rate far exceeded the interest rate that Brazilian
industries were charged. As a result, many industries were able to borrow money
at no cost.
37 CARvouNIs, supra note 10, at 124.
38 SPERO, supra note 25, at 180.
39 SPERO, supra note 25, at 181.
40 WILLIAM CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE
264 (1984).
41 Id.
42 Pang, supra note 2, at 130-132.
1994] 329
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comment of former Minister of Finance and later chief economic
advisor for President Joao Baptista Figueirdo (1979-1985),
Delfim Neto, that "debts are not paid, debts are rolled," became
a distant memory.43
IL THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE IMF AN
CoNDrrIoNALrrY
A. What Is An International Organization?
Multilateral cooperation among nation-states has fostered
the creation of many international organizations to serve both
political and economic purposes. 44 Although these interna-
tional organizations usually do not have explicit supranational
powers, "they may gain institutional strength over time that en-
ables them to influence the behavior of individual [nation]
states to a significant degree."45 As a consequence, interna-
tional organizations 46 can assume an autonomous international
role that makes them "actors" in the international political-eco-
nomic system along with nation-states. 47 Under international
law, the term "international organization" is predominantly
used to refer to entities that are comprised exclusively or
mainly of nation-states and are established by a treaty.48 More-
over, the treaty that created the international organization is
the "constitutive instrument" that is the governing body of law
for the organization.49 What gives international organizations
43 ELIANA CARDOSO, BRAZILIAN DEBT CRISIS: PAST AND PRESENT 127 (1989).
44 FRANLiN R. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 5 (6th ed.
1990).
45 Id.
46 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Part II, Chapter 2, Introduc-
tory Note, states: International organizations are created by international agree-
ments and are governed by the law pertaining to such agreements. The law of
international organizations has become a separate subdivision of international
law, much as in national legal systems the law of corporations developed, indepen-
dently of the law of contracts even while retaining links to it. Particularly when
organs of an international organization are authorized by its constitutive agree-
ment to make decisions, allocate funds, admit and expel members and interpret or
even amend the constitutive agreement, the organization can be said to have a law
of its own, a kind of "international constitutional law."
47 Id.
48 Louis HENKaN, RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER & HANS SMrr,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIs 344 (3d. ed. 1993) [hereinafter
HENKIN].
49 Id.
330 [Vol. 6:323
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an "international legal personality" is their capacity to effectu-
ate legal acts "on the international plane rather than within a
municipal law system."50 Additionally, international organiza-
tions must be able to exercise their legal capacity and assume
international responsibility for their acts in order to "draw a
distinction in terms of legal powers and obligations between the
organization and its member states."51 As a result, this distinc-
tion requires an international organization to have a governing
set of rules that can exercise such legal capacity and responsi-
bilities in the international political-economic system.52 The
IMF is such an organization that operates under its own body of
law called the Articles of Agreement.5 3
B. The IMF As An International Organization
During the closing months of the Second World War, the
United States, Great Britain and the original members of the
United Nations, met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to con-
sider the institutional framework needed for international eco-
nomic cooperation during the post-war period.54 The delegates
at Bretton Woods were convinced that an unprecedented degree
of monetary cooperation was the only avenue which would fore-
stall a repetition of the monetary crisis of the 1930's.5 5 Conse-
50 Id. at 347.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND, 60
Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39; 20 U.S.T. 2775; 29 U.S.T. 2203, as
amended through 1992 [hereinafter ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT]. The Articles of
Agreement are the governing rules for the IMF. The Articles of Agreement were
adopted at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire, July 22, 1944. They were entered into force on December
27, 1945. Amended effective July 28, 1969, by the modifications approved by the
Board of Governors in Resolution No. 23-5. Adopted May 31, 1968, and amended
effective April 1, 1978, by the modifications approved by the Board of Governors in
Resolution No 31-4, adopted April 30, 1976.
54 Milan Bulajic, Indebtedness Of The Developing Countries And The New In-
ternational Economic Order, in FOREIGN DEBTS IN THE PRESENT AND A NEW INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 43 (Detlev Chr. Dicke ed., 1986).
55 ROOT, supra note 44, at 459. The Great Depression of the 1930's, coupled
with massive flows of speculative capital, promulgated the collapse of the interna-
tional monetary system that was based on a modified form of the gold standard.
The modified gold system was a system whereby central banks held some or all of
their reserves in sterling, dollars, or francs rather than in gold. In 1931, Great
Britain halted the gold convertibility of the pound and the United States devalued
1994]
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quently, the Bretton Woods convention created the IMF to
effectively manage international economic problems such as un-
stable exchange rates, competitive currency depreciations, and
substantial restrictions on capital movement.56
Specifically, the Articles of Agreement, which consist of Ar-
ticle I through Article XXXI, 5v form the substantive law of the
IMF. Underlying the stated purposes of the Articles of Agree-
ment are the broad provisions of Article 1.58 Most important are
the fundamental objectives of Article I (ii) and (v).59 Section (ii)
states in pertinent part: "[that] the promotion and maintenance
of high levels of employment and real income and... the devel-
opment of the productive resources of all members [are the] pri-
the dollar by raising the price of gold from $20.67 to $35.00 an ounce in 1933. As a
result, each country instituted unfair currency depreciations, exchange controls,
currency blocs, and protectionist trade agreements. ROOT, supra note 44, at 459-
60.
6 Bulajic, supra note 54, at 44.
57 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53.
58 The broad purposes of Article I are:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collabo-
ration on international monetary problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade,
and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high
levels of employment and real income and to the development of the
productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic
policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrange-
ments among members, and to avoid competitive exchange
depreciation.
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in
respect of current transactions between members and in the elimina-
tion of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world
trade.
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the
Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus
providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their bal-
ance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national
or international prosperity.
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the
degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of
members. ARTIcLEs OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. I.
59 Sidney Dell, Stabilization: The Political Economy of Overkill in THE PoIT-
IcAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDE-ELoPMENT 222 (Charles K. Wilber
ed., 4th ed. 1988). This article was originally presented to a Conference on IMF
Conditionality held by the Institute for International Economics in March 1982. It
has been published in IMF CONDITIONALITY 343 (John Williamson ed., 1983).
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss2/4
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mary objectives of [the IMF's] economic policy."60 Equally
important, is the fundamental objective of section (v)61 that pro-
vides member nation-states with the "opportunity to correct
maladjustments in balance of payments without resorting to
measures destructive of national or international prosperity."
[emphasis added]. 62 In addition, the IMF shall exercise all its
policies and decisions under the auspices of the purposes and
objectives set forth in Article 1.63
Equally important, according to Article XXIX,64 the IMF it-
self has the power and authority to make a binding interpreta-
tion of the Articles of Agreement.65  Any question of
interpretation arising between members of the IMF or between
the IMF and a member country is submitted to the Executive
Board for a decision.6 6 Moreover, members are only allowed to
appeal the Executive Board's decision to the Board of Governors
"whose decision shall be final."67 Finally, the IMF is not part of
the United Nations family of organizations and is not subject to
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Jus-
tice.68 Accordingly, the legal limits of the IMF's decision and
policy making discretion are only enforceable by the IMF's gov-
erning body.
The IMF is governed and managed by its own internal
structural framework.69 Specifically, the IMF's organization
60 ARTicLEs OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. I(ii).
61 Dell, supra note 59, at 223.
62 ARTicLEs OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. I(v).
63 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. I.
64 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XXIX(a).
5 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XXIX(a).
66 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XXIX(a).
67 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XXIX sec. (b). Under section
(c), when a disagreement arises between the IMF and a member while the IMF is
undergoing a process of liquidation or when a member has withdrawn, the "disa-
greement shall be submitted to arbitration by a tribunal of three arbitrators, one
appointed by the Fund, another appointed by the member or withdrawing mem-
ber, and an umpire who, unless the parties otherwise agree, shall be appointed by
the President of the International Court of Justice or such other authority as may
have been prescribed by regulation adopted by the Fund. The umpire shall have
full power to settle all questions of procedure in any case where the parties are in
disagreement with respect thereto." ARTIcLEs OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art.
XXEX(c).
68 See Agreement between the UN and the IMF, Apr. 15, 1948, art. 1(2) 16
U.N.T.S. 325.
69 HENmN, supra note 43, at 1421.
1994]
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and management structure is composed of a Board of Gover-
nors, an Executive Board, a Managing Director, and a staff.7 0
Although Article XII section 2(a) provides that "all [the] powers
under this Agreement [Articles of Agreement] not conferred di-
rectly on the Board of Governors, the Executive Board, or the
Managing Director shall be vested in the Board of Governors,"71
the vast majority of the powers originally conferred on the
Board of Governors "has been delegated to the Executive Direc-
tors."7 2 The IMF's Board of Governors meets only once a year
with each member nation-state represented by a Governor who
is either the member countries' Minister of Finance or
Chairperson of the Central Bank.73
The day to day operations of the IMF are managed-by the
Executive Board, which consists of Executive Directors and a
Managing director who acts as the chairperson. 74 According to
Article XII section 3(b)(i)(ii),7 5 the Executive Board consists of
twenty Directors, of which five shall be appointed by the five
members that have the largest quotas76 and the remaining fif-
teen are elected every two years by the remaining members. 77
Article XII section (3)(b),78 stipulates that the Board of Gover-
nors may increase the number of Executive Directors elected by
the general fund members, by one or two, if eighty-five percent
or more of the IMF's member countries agree. As a result, six-
teen Executive Directors have been consistently elected by the
IMF's general member countries. The number of Executive Di-
rectors may also be augmented by one or two, if during the two
years before an election the five member countries with the
largest quotas do not include the two members that have pro-
70 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note-53, art. XII sec. (1).
71 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XII.
72 HENIN, supra note 48, at 1421.
73 HENKIN, supra note 48, at 1421.
74 HENKIN, supra note 48, at 1421.
75 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XII sec. (b)(i)(ii).
76 Upon entering the IMF, each country was allotted a quota in accordance
with its relative economic size. Twenty-five percent of a country's quota was paid
to the IMF in gold and the remainder in the country's currency. Since quotas were
calculated in the 1944 U.S. dollar, the dollar equivalents of nondollar currencies
were determined by their respective par values: The IMF started operations in
1947 with aggregate quotas of $8 billion, but successive quota increases had raised
the total to 28.5 billion by 1971. RoOT, supra note 44, at 461.
77 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XII sec. 3 (b)(i)(ii).
78 ARTICLEs OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XII sec. (3)(b).
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vided the IMF with largest amount of convertible currency for
its overall operations. 79 Since the early 1980's, Saudi Arabia
has been allowed to appoint one Executive Director because of
Saudi Arabia's increased funding to the IMF.80 Currently, the
Executive Board consists of 22 Executive Directors.
Presently, the countries possessing the six largest quotas
are, in descending order: the United States, the United King-
dom, Germany, France, Japan, and Saudi Arabia.81 Under Ar-
ticle XII(3) section (b)(iv),8 2 the American Republics have been
allowed to appoint three Executive Directors. The remaining
member nation states "with homogenous interests have [volun-
tarily] combined to form fairly stable combinations in order to
muster the prescribed minimum number of votes necessary to
elect [the remaining twelve] Executive Director[s]." 3 The fif-
teen persons receiving the greatest number of votes shall be Ex-
ecutive Directors, provided that no person receive less than four
percent of the total number of eligible votes.84 Each Governor of
the "remaining countries" eligible to vote must cast for one per-
son all of the votes to which he or she is entitled to under Article
XII section (5)(a).8 5 Under article XII section (5)(a)8 6 each mem-
ber has two hundred fifty votes "plus one additional vote for
each part of its quota equivalent to one hundred thousand spe-
cial voting rights." 7 In other words, the "remaining members"
elect Executive Directors by forming constituencies or voting
blocs where they combine their voting strength.
The size of a member nation-state's quota is also significant
in two other respects. First, it determines the voting power of a
member's Executive Director.8 For example, the Executive Di-
rector of the United States has the largest percentage of voting
power and the United Kingdom has the second largest. This
gives the U.S. and U.K. a dominant voice in the management of
79 ARTiCLES op AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XII sec. (3Xc).
80 HENIN, supra note 48, at 1422.
81 HENKIN, supra note 48, at 1422.
82 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XII sec. (3)(b)(iv).
83 HENI N, supra note 48, at 1421-1422.
84 ARTIcLEs OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, schedule E(1)(2).
85 ArmCLEs OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XII sec. (5Xa).
86 ARTIcLEs OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XII sec. (5Xa).
87 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. XII sec. (5Xa).
88 RoO, supra note 44, at 463.
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the IMF. Second, the size of a country's quota determines the
amount of resources that it can draw from the IMF.8 9 The IMF
does not award loans to its members. Instead, the IMF allows
member countries to use their currency to purchase the curren-
cies of other members. 90 A member country will draw on IMF
currency resources in "tranches" which represent twenty five
percent of a members quota.9 1 Because twenty five percent of a
member's quota was contributed by the country in gold or now
possibly in currency-reserve assets,92 when a member asks for a
drawing on the first tranche it is really borrowing from its own
assets. There is no requirement that member countries use
their tranche first, rather they are allowed to use the other
three tranches (hereinafter the credit tranches) first.93
However, when a member country attempts to draw beyond
25% of its quota, thus seeking the use of the three credit
tranches, a member is subject to certain conditions. 94 It is these
credit tranches that provide the IMF with the ability to extend
assistance to member countries that face a temporary deficit in
their balance of payments. As a result, the three upper credit
tranches are increasingly difficult to gain access to. A member
country must prove by extrinsic evidence that there is a "sub-
89 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. III sec. (3Xa).
90 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. V sec. (3).
91 ARTIcLEs OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. V sec. (3)(b)(c).
92 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art III, sec. 3(a). After 1979, mem-
ber nation-states were allowed to replace gold payments with payments in the cur-
rencies of other members.
93 ARTicLEs OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. V sec. (3)(b).
94 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. V sec. (3)(a)(b) provides for the
following conditions:
(b) A member shall be entitled to purchase the currencies of other members
from the Fund in exchange for an equivalent amount of its own currency
subject to the following conditions:
i) The member's use of the general resources of the Fund would be in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the policies adopted
under them;
(ii) The member represents that it has a need to make the purchase be-
cause its balance of payments or its reserve position or developments in
its reserves;
(iii) The proposed purchase would be a reserve tranche purchase or would
not cause the Fund's holdings of the purchasing member's currency to
exceed two hundred percent of its basic quota.
(iv) The Fund has not previously declared under Section 5 of this Article,
Article VI, Section 1, or Article XXVI, Section 2(a) that the member de-
siring to purchase is ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund.
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss2/4
IMI CUIVNI.TJLI-5ALII I I
stantial justification" for the use of the upper three credit
tranches.95 This is where the purchase of foreign currency (cap-
ital lending) from the IMF begins to resemble a loan. A member
is a given a specific time in which it must "pay back" the IMF
for the foreign currency it has "borrowed," and must show the
IMF that the member will pursue economic reforms that will
enable it to repay the IMF. Use of the upper credit tranches is
always contingent upon a member country adopting an IMF
austerity program that is implemented under the auspices of
the IMF conditionality requirements. 96 In reality, freely con-
vertible funds, such as U.S. dollars, are sold to the member
state "subject to the member's agreement to repurchase the con-
vertible funds within a stated period."97
Up until the mid 1970's the IMF implemented its stated
policies of Article I with great success through short term cur-
rency sales and economic policy requirements, which were read-
ily accepted by the developing countries. 98 However, by the
middle of the 1970's, international political-economic problems
"became increasingly complicated, larger in magnitude, and
more interrelated."99 Indeed, by the early 1980's commercial
lending to the developed countries ended because of Mexico's
announcement that it could no longer service its foreign debt.
As a result, the IMF became a "lender of last resort" for the
indebted Third World countries. 100 Specifically, the IMF was
the only source of foreign capital for many of the indebted devel-
oping countries. Thus, the IMF's political-economic power over
the domestic policy implementations of the indebted developing
nation-states' governments substantially increased.
95 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. V sec. (3) (b)(cXdXe).
96 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, CONDrFIONS GOVERNING USE OF THE
FUND'S GENERAL RESOURCES, art. V sec. (3)(a). "The Fund shall adopt policies on the
use of its general resources, including policies on stand-by or similar arrange-
ments, and may adopt special polices for special balance of payments problems,
that will assist members to solve their balance of payments problems in a manner
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate
safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund." ARTICLES
OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. V sec. (3)a).
97 HENKiN, supra note 48, at 1425.
98 POOLE & STAMOS, supra note 1, at 56-57.
99 POOLE & STAMOS, supra note 1, at 55.
100 POOLE & STAMOS, supra note 1, at 57.
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C. Brazil And IMF Conditionality Requirements
Presently, Brazil holds approximately 111 billion dollars in
foreign debt,' 0 ' which constitutes 9.6 percent of the entire 1.15
trillion dollar Third World debt.102 Brazil was forced to turn to
the IMF for capital lending when commercial banking institu-
tions from Western Europe and the United States discontinued
their lending to Brazil in early 1983.103 Moreover, the inability
of the indebted developing countries [i.e. Brazil] to make de-
creasing export revenues meet rising debt obligations led to bal-
ance of payments deficits for the indebted Third World nation-
states.'0 4 Consequently, the IMF took hold of the pivotal role as
"short term capital lender" and coordinator of debt renegotia-
tions with commercial banks on behalf of the indebted coun-
tries.10 5 Above all, in return for capital funding and facilitating
debt restructuring negotiations with the private banking insti-
tutions of the North, the IMF demanded the indebted Third
World countries to adopt stringent "austerity programs" which
were governed by the IMF's traditional conditionality require-
ments. 10 6 Consequently, Brazil received financial assistance
from the IMF in early 1983, and the IMF instituted rigid aus-
terity programs for Brazil.10 7
When a country requests a "loan" from the IMF, the IMF
sends a team of economic advisors into the particular country to
analyze the nation-state's economy and balance of payments
problems.' 08 But before the IMF approves the "loan," the IMF
requires that the member nation-state adopt rigid and compre-
hensive economic policies in order to be allowed to purchase one
of the three upper credit tranches. 10 9 This is what the IMF tra-
ditionally refers to as its conditionality requirements. "Condi-
tionality [is] understood as being the policies the Fund expects a
101 WORLD BANK, supra note 3.
102 Pang, supra note 2, at 129.
103 CLINE, supra note 40, at 264-265.
104 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PEOPLE, LONG SHADOW OF GLOBAL DEBT 195
(1988).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Pang, supra note 2, at 128.
108 POOLE & STAMOS, supra note 2, at 57.
109 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, CONDITIONS GOVERNING USE OF
FUND'S GENERAL RESOURCES, art. V sec. (3).
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member country to follow in order to be able to use the Fund's
general resources."110 Except for a short period of time directly
after the adoption of the IMF treaty in 1945, the IMF member
countries have agreed that the IMF's financial assistance
should be conditional on the adoption of IMF austerity pro-
grams."' Specifically, the conditionality requirement is felt to
be necessary to ensure that a certain nation-state "will get its
own economic house in order, which also signals the commercial
banking community that the country is taking the kind of meas-
ures deemed necessary to enable it to make good on its [foreign]
debt obligations."112 As a result, IMF approval also became a
prerequisite for an indebted developing country to obtain more
loans from the commercial banks of the developed countries. 113
The IMF "seal of approval" improves the debtor nation-state's
status as a reasonable credit risk for a commercial bank to loan
capital to once again."l 4
There are varying degrees of IMF conditionality. The de-
gree of conditionality depends on how much a member country
is 'requesting to "borrow." As a result, IMF conditionality is
"low-" regarding the first tranche. However, conditionality is
"high" when a member requests a currency purchase in excess
of the first tranche. Those purchases beyond the first tranche
are referred to as the three credit tranches." 5 High condition-
ality implies substantial socioeconomic preconditioning, setting
specific economic targets, establishing performance criteria and
describing policy proposals, with each step constituting endless
negotiating, planning, drafting, monitoring, and adjusting.116
Specifically, Brazil and the IMF agreed to several credit
tranche purchases between 1983 and 1985.117 The IMF agreed
to these credit tranche purchases only when the Brazilian gov-
ernment agreed to: (1) continue to devalue their currency, the
110 Samual Lichtensztejn, supra note 6, at 209-210 (quoting Joseph Gold "Con-
ditionality," Pamphlet Series no. 31 (1979)).
111 MANUEL GuiTAN, ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND CONDITIONAITY 75 (1982).
112 POOLE & STAMOS, supra note 1, at 57-58.
113 POOLE & STAMOS, supra note 1, at 57.
114 POOLE & STAMOS, supra note 1, at 57.
115 Karl M. Meessen, IMF Conditionality and State Sovereignty, in FOREIGN
DEBTS IN THE PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 117 (Detlev
Chr. Dicke ed., 1986).
116 Id. at 119.
117 Pang, supra note 2, at 128.
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Cruzeiro; (2) initiate massive cuts in domestic spending; (3)
freeze all wages; (4) reduce most of government subsidized
credit; and (5) curb state industries' voracious appetite for for-
eign borrowing. 118 Since Brazil is the Third World's largest in-
debted nation-state, the IMF conditionality requirements have
had a more pronounced effect on Brazil than on any other in-
debted developing country.11 9  Moreover, because Brazil
purchased currency from the upper three credit tranches, the
IMF instituted high conditionality requirements for Brazil's
austerity programs.
As a result of the IMF conditionality policies, Brazil exper-
ienced a four percent drop in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
a 211 percent rise in inflation, and a twelve percent decline in
employment by the end of 1983.120 Consequently, an economic
recession arose which provoked urban food riots by the unem-
ployed and impoverished. 12 1 In 1984, Brazilians directed over
900 riots in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and other urban centers
against the IMF as the alleged source of their socioeconomic
problems. 122 Brazil's Gross Domestic Product declined from
$296 billion in 1982 to only $226 billion in 1985.123 As of 1988,
almost half of Brazil's population lived in households where in-
come was less than one hundred twenty dollars a month.124
III. IMF CONDITIONALITY AND BRAzIL's NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY
Because the IMF's terms of conditionality perpetuate a sit-
uation where the IMF is "running the financial and economic
policies of a great number of debtor States," the IMF may have
undermined the international law principle of nation-state sov-
ereignty. 125 IMF conditionality requirements have far reaching
implications for a basic principle of nation-state identity, that of
118 Pang, supra note 2, at 130.
119 See Pastor, supra note 4, at 327.
120 Pang, supra note 2, at 130.
121 Pang, supra note 2, at 130.
122 Pang, supra note 2, at 130.
123 INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, A.NuAL REPORT (1986).
124 Juan de Onis, Brazil On The Tightrope Toward Democracy, FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS, Fall 1989, at 157.
125 Meessen, supra note 115, at 117.
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national sovereignty. 126 Sovereignty reserves to each sovereign
nation-state the exclusive right to "take any action it thinks fit
provided only that the action does not interfere with the rights
[and obligations] of other States, and is not prohibited by inter-
national law on that or any ground." 127
The notion of sovereignty 128 was developed in the early
stages of the Middle Ages as a reaction to the claims of the Em-
perors of the Holy Roman Empire, who contended they were the
temporal rulers of the globe. 129 Although the claims of the Holy
Roman Emperors did not fully correspond to reality, this claim
was resented by all other leaders in Europe who saw these
claims of global-imperial authority as an impediment to their
longing to be the master of their own destinies.130 "A sovereign
ruler, master of his own destiny, cannot be subjected to rules
made and enforced by others, hence he must be freed from the
observance of the law - PRINCEPS LEGIBUS SOLUTUS." 1 3 1 This is
known as absolute sovereignty. It was the very purpose of the
notion of absolute sovereignty to allow leaders, other than the
Holy Roman Emperor, to be masters of their own destinies so
that they could lead their own sovereign countries. 132 As a re-
sult, a basic principle of international law, that of nation-state
sovereignty, began to emerge.
However, the notion of absolute sovereignty did not remain
the accepted definition of nation-state sovereignty. As soon as
various sovereign nation-states began to enter into relations
with one another, interdependency grew and absolute sover-
eignty eventually became an obsolete principle. As a conse-
quence, states adopted the notion of relative sovereignty which
126 SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11-12 (1983).
127 Id at 11.
128 BLAci's LAw DIcTioNARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary de-
fines sovereignty as: "The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which
any independent state is governed; supreme political authority; the supreme will;
paramount control of the constitution and frame of government and its administra-
tion; the self sufficient source of political power, from which all specific political
powers are derived; the international independence of a state, combined with the
right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation; also a
political society, or state, which is sovereign and independent." [emphasis added].
Id.
129 IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 21 (1989).
I Id. at 21.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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provides that any state is said to be sovereign, if its acts are not
subject to any rules other than those of customary international
law and treaties. 13 3
According to the Corfu Channel Case,'34 sovereignty is the
entire body of rights and attributes which a state possesses in
its territory, to the exclusion of all other states, and also in its
relations with other states. 135 Judge Alvarez held that sover-
eignty is a notion that "has its foundation in national sentiment
and in the psychology of the peoples, in fact it is deeply
rooted." 136 Additionally, the court reasoned that since there is a
greater interdependence among the world's nation-states, the
international community can no longer define sovereignty as an
absolute and rigid-individual right of every State where nation-
states are only subject to international rules they accepted. 137
As a result, the court defined sovereignty of States as "an insti-
tution, an international social function of a psychological char-
acter, which has to be in accordance with the new international
law.'38
Therefore, sovereignty can no longer be defined in terms of
the absolute power of a nation-state since states are increas-
ingly interdependent. However, according to Louis Henkin, 139
nation state sovereignty still essentially includes: "indepen-
dence, equality, autonomy, territorial authority, integrity and
inviolability, impermeability and privacy." 40 Specifically, Hen-
kin suggests that a nation-state should not be subject to any
external decision making power unless it has "voluntarily con-
sented to such authority."' 4 ' Henkin states further that:
By their ability to consent, to have relations and conclude agree-
ments, States have in effect created the International political
system, by a kind of "social contract." By their ability to consent
133 Id. at 22.
134 United Kingdom v. Albania, (Individual Opinion By Judge Alvarez), 1949
I.C.J. 39, 43.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Louis Henkin is a world renowned international legal scholar and is Uni-
versity Professor Emeritus at Columbia University, School of Law. IENU N, supra
note 48.
140 HENKIn, supra note 48, at 15-16.
141 HENKIN, supra note 48, at 15-16.
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to external authority and to conclude agreements, they have cre-
ated norms and institutions to govern these relations, the interna-
tional law of the system. Only States can make law for
themselves. States can make law for entities they create (e.g. inter-
national organizations), for entities created by individual States
(i.e. companies) and for human individuals. (emphasis added).142
Therefore, the question is: has the IMF undermined Bra-
zil's national sovereignty by usurping Brazil's ability to imple-
ment its own monetary and fiscal policies without interference
from the IMF conditionality requirements? Indeed, the answer
to this question may lie in analyzing whether Brazil has con-
sented to an infringement of its national sovereignty by simply
being a member of the IMF and having consented to the IMF
austerity programs. Moreover, has the IMF violated the funda-
mental objectives stated in Article I (i)-(vi)? 143
A. The Capitalist/Free Market View of IMF Conditionality
In the view of political-economist Robert Z. Aliber,144 the
Third World Debt Crisis of the 1980's was substantially rooted
"in international market forces as, first, lenders increased the
availability of foreign finance with "petrodollar recycling" in the
1970's and second, borrowers used the net capital flows to pay
for increased consumption and imports."'145 Aliber explicitly ex-
empts the IMF from any responsibility for the austerity pro-
grams currently imposed in Latin America, namely Brazil. He
states that the IMF conditionality requirements became inevi-
table once the indebted developing countries could no longer re-
pay their foreign debts. 146 Specifically, he argues that even
without the IMF austerity programs and their high conditional-
ity requirements, Brazil would still have had to adopt the same
policies on its own in order to repay its foreign debt and to gain
142 HENKIN, supra note 48, at 16.
143 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. I (i)-(vi).
144 Robert Z. Aliber, The Debt Cycle in Latin America, in INTERNATIONAL POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIvES GLOBAL POWER AND WEALTH 313 (Jeffry A. Frieden
& David A. Lake eds., 2d ed. 1991). Robert Z. Aliber is a political-economist who
has specialized in the study of Latin America's economic development. His views
of the IMF's role on the indebted countries of Latin America also appear in the
Winter 1985-86 issue of the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,
Vol. 27, No. 4.
145 Id. at 313.
146 Id.
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access to new commercial lending from the banking institutions
of Western Europe and the United States. 147
In essence, Aliber contends that Brazil would have had to
experience a decline in real income, a drastic rise in unemploy-
ment, substantially reduced public spending, and a reduction of
consumption of foreign imports even without the IMF condition-
ality requirements. Aliber further argues that the "IMF [aus-
terity] programs may have lessened the squeeze on the private
sector because of the Fund's efforts to reduce fiscal deficits as a
share of national income." 14
B. The Marxist Interpretation of the IMF
According to political-economist Manual Pastor, Jr.,149 the
IMF has become an enforcer of domestic discipline in Latin
America on behalf of the capitalists of the developed coun-
tries.'50 In Pastor's view, the IMF austerity programs have
been beneficial only to foreign and Latin American capitalists,
have depressed Latin American growth, and have harmed the
Latin American lower classes. "In the years of the debt crisis,
the IMF's power and command over Latin America has risen
dramatically. It is a performance that has hurt the vast major-
ity of Latin Americans while delivering benefits to a thin strand
of the industrial and banking elite in the developed and devel-
oping countries."' 5 '
Further, Pastor contends, it may be difficult to distinguish
the IMF's effect on Latin America's indebted countries from the
effects of the generalized debt crisis. However, "the IMF cannot
escape blame for the disaster of the last five years (1984-1989),
particularly since the IMF has been unwilling and unable to
deal with key pressing issues: the need for both Northern
147 Id. at 319.
148 Id.
149 Pastor, supra note 4, at 320. Manuel Pastor, Jr. is also an economist that
has specialized in the study of Latin America's economic development. However,
his interpretation comes from the Marxist perspective and believes that the in-
debted Latin American countries are subject to an unprecedented degree of supra-
national authority from the IMF. His views appear in Latin America, the Debt
Crisis, and the International Monetary Fund, 16 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
790-110 (1989).
150 Pastor, supra note 4, at 328.
151 Pastor, supra note 4, at 332.
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[Western industrialized countries] adjustment and a new devel-
opment alternative for Latin America." 152 As a result, Pastor
argues that the IMF has irrevocably become associated in Latin
America with austerity, stagnation, regressive redistribution [of
income], and often popular protest.153
Pastor additionally contends that the IMF and its policies
are also benefiting various factions of local economic elites
within Latin American nation-states by maintaining their posi-
tion of social and economic domination. 54 It seems as though
Pastor is implying that the IMF has usurped the national sover-
eignty of Latin American countries by actively promoting a par-
ticular social class within these countries.
IV. CONDITIONALITY V. STATE SovERiGNwY
International law recognizes that a requirement of State-
hood is to have national sovereignty. 155 It is a nation-state's na-
tional government that has exclusive jurisdiction over the
territory of the State and is the only recognized legal represen-
tative of the State vis-a-vis other States (emphasis added).156 "It
is the very essence of sovereignty that no State claiming to be
sovereign can recognize another State as having legal authority
over it."'15 Historically, the principle of nation-state sover-
eignty was usually only infringed by an actual military invasion
by another state. However, in the 20th Century, the notion of
economic sovereignty, where a sovereign nation-state "ought to
be the master of its own destiny in the economic field,"' 58 has
become one of the defining factors of a country's sovereignty. As
economic interdependency has grown, the actual sovereignty of
nation-states has decreased. Presently, the international polit-
ical system now encompasses approximately one hundred sixty
sovereign nation-states and their mutual power relations,
"which may be characterized as cooperative, competitive, or
antagonistic."159
152 Pastor, supra note 4, at 333.
153 Pastor, supra note 4, at 333.
154 Pastor, supra note 4, at 334.
155 RoO, supra note 44, at 2.
156 RoOr, supra note 44, at 2.
157 IGNAZ SEIDI-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 126, at 24.
158 IGNAZ SEIDI-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 126, at 24.
159 RooT, supra note 44.
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Nation-states, however, are no longer the only "actors"160 in
the international political economy that have affected the na-
tional sovereignties of states. Public international organiza-
tions, created by treaties between States, 1 16 have become non-
state "actors" in international political-economic and geopoliti-
cal relations. Since 1945, one of the most significant public in-
ternational organizations for international economic relations
has been the IMF. As a result, the IMF has become the focus of
much debate since it has quite possibly undermined nation-
states' national sovereignties.
A prime example of this possible infraction of a basic princi-
ple of international law is the IMF's past and present relations
with the indebted developing countries, namely Brazil. Since
the IMF terms of conditionality have imposed several austerity
programs on the Brazilian economy, the IMF may have under-
mined Brazil's national sovereignty. Many international econo-
mists, such as Manuel Pastor, Jr.,16 2 have held the IMF strictly
liable for Latin America's "lost decade of growth" that occurred
in the 1980's.163 This implies that the IMF has undermined the
Latin American countries' ability and inherent right to main-
tain economic growth without having the IMF infringing upon
their respective national sovereignties. Therefore, the IMF may
have violated international law by undermining Brazil's ability
to implement its own economic and ultimately its own social
policies.
Although the IMF has "forced" Brazil to accept several aus-
terity programs under the auspices of the conditionality re-
quirements, Brazil is a member of the IMF. As a consequence,
Brazil may have, in fact, authorized the IMF to infringe upon
their domestic policies with the IMF conditionality require-
ments. The Articles of Agreement 164 imply that a member na-
tion-state's national sovereignty is not infringed upon by the
IMF conditionality unless, the IMF violates the rules of its Arti-
cles of Agreement 165 or the Guidelines on Conditionality 6 6 in-
terpreting them. Specifically, section nine of the Guidelines on
160 HENKIN, supra note 48.
161 HENKIN, supra note 48.
162 Pastor, supra note 4.
163 Pastor, supra note 4, at 320.
164 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53.
165 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53.
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Conditionality provides that the IMF must impose performance
criteria for any credit tranche purchase, but this "criteria will be
limited to those that are necessary to evaluate implementation
of the program with a view to ensuring the achievement of its
objectives"(emphasis added).167 Such "criteria will normally be
confined to (i) macroeconomic variables, and (ii) those necessary
to implement specific provisions of the Articles [Of Agreement]
or policies adopted under them."168 In addition, section four of
the Guidelines On Conditionality imposes a duty on the IMF to
"pay due regard to the domestic social and political objectives,
the economic priorities, and the circumstances of members, in-
cluding the causes of their balance of payments problems." 169
The IMF is not only authorized to, but it must impose specific
macroeconomic targets, through its austerity programs and re-
sulting conditionality policies, for member countries who
purchase currency from the three credit tranches. Accordingly,
with regards to Brazil, the IMF did not violate the Guidelines
On Conditionality since the IMF is authorized to impose appro-
priate austerity programs for member countries that purchase
from the three credit tranches.
The IMF may have violated the Articles of Agreement by
imposing conditionality requirements that have led to negative
growth rates for Brazil. Therefore, the conditionality require-
ments may have violated article I section (ii) of the Articles of
Agreement that provides that the IMF implement policies for
economic growth. Section (ii) states in part: "[that] the promo-
tion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real in-
come and.., the development of the productive resources of all
members [are the] primary objectives of economic policy." Ar-
guably, the IMF may have violated article I (ii)17 ° since the IMF
conditionality requirements have fostered negative growth and
increased impoverishment in Brazil since 1983. However, the
166 GUIDELINES ON CONDmONALITY, Decision No. 6056-(79/38), Sections 1-12
(March 2, 1979), in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 20 (1983). The Guidelines On Conditionality were
adopted by the IMF's Executive Board in order to clearly set out the IMF's require-
ments for the use of the IMF's general resources and for stand-by arrangements.
167 Id. at 22, sec. 9.
168 Id. at 22, sec. 9.
169 Id. at 21, sec. 4.
170 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. I(ii).
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IMF is only to use the principles of article I as guidelines. 171
Article I (ii)172 also states that the IMF must only contribute to
the economic growth and stability.
Although Brazil did experience a "lost decade of growth" in
the 1980's, current economic data points out that the past eco-
nomic hardships, caused by the IMF's conditionality, have led to
economic growth and a decreasing debt burden for Brazil over
the past two years. Specifically, Brazil's foreign debt was
thirty-five percent of its GDP in 1985,173 where as at the end of
1992 its foreign debt was only twenty-four percent of its
GDP. 174 Equally important, in 1993: (1) Brazil's GDP has
grown 4.6 percent; (2) its industrial production has increased
8.1 percent; and (3) its current account had a positive balance of
2.5 billion to the third quarter of 1993.175 Despite negative eco-
nomic growth during the 1980's, the IMF conditionality require-
ments have actually fostered Brazil's economic growth and
reduced a portion of its debt burden. Therefore, the IMF has not
violated article I sections (i) through (i)176.
Since Brazil has specifically consented to the terms of IMF
conditionality, no violation of the prescribed rules of the IMF
has occurred. As a result, the IMF has not violated interna-
tional law since it has strictly abided by the explicit rules found
in its Articles of Agreement and the Guidelines On
Conditionality.
Even though the IMF has not violated the international
law principle of national sovereignty, tens of millions of
Brazilians still have fervent nationalistic objections to the IMF
conditionality requirements and explicitly blame the IMF for
Brazil's "lost decade of growth."177 In 1987, former democrati-
cally elected President Sarney, announced that Brazil would
place a moratorium on Brazilian debt repayment to all foreign
banks. 178 Former President Sarney concluded:
171 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53.
172 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. I(ii).
173 Emerging Market Indicators, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22nd-28th, 1994, at 114.
The ECONOMISVS figures are based on the World Bank and IMF statistical reports.
174 Id.
175 Emerging Market Indicators, EcONOMIST, March 12th, 1994, at 126.
176 ARTIcLEs OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. I(i)-(vi).
177 Pastor, supra note 4, at 320.
178 U.S. Govt. Doc. BRAZILLN DEBT CRISIS, (1988).
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"Brazil will not pay its foreign debt with recession, not with un-
employment, not with hunger. We believe that in settling this ac-
count at such high social and economic costs we would then have
to surrender our freedom (i.e. our national sovereignty), for a debt
paid with poverty is an account paid for with democracy. I thus
wish to reaffirm with all seriousness and firmness that there is no
solution possible without reformulation of international economic
structures (i.e. the IMF)."179
Brazil perceives the IMF as a creation of the United States
and Great Britain, managed substantially by the industrialized
countries of the North. Indeed, the United States, which has
less than one percent of the total population of the IMF member
countries, had 18.86 percent of the IMF's total voting power as
of April 1992.180 As a result, Brazil sees the IMF as a policy tool
of the United States and the other five majority voting mem-
bers. Thus, although the IMF has not violated international
law, its ultimate legitimacy is at stake. The ability of the IMF
to implement its austerity programs will affect the future
growth and stability of the Brazilian political-economy, as well
as the future of Brazil's social development.
V. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
The Third World Debt Crisis has now moved into its second
decade. It is no longer a process of emergency loan bail-outs,
but rather a situation in which the IMF must effectively man-
age a 1.15 trillion dollar Third World Debt.' 18  With the recent
democratization of Brazil, the ruling government must now lis-
ten more carefully and sincerely respond to the voting
masses.'8 2 Any solution the IMF creates should involve eco-
nomic growth for Brazil. The socio-economic inequalities in
Brazil are still at extremely high levels with approximately
179 UN Doc. A/40/PV.4 p. 22. Address By His Excellency Jose Sarney to the XL
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 23, 1985.
180 HENKiN, supra note 48, at 1422.
181 Pang, supra note 2.
182 Pang, supra note 2, at 138-139. For a more detailed analysis of Brazil's
redemocratization See STEPHAN ALFRED, DEMOCRATIZING BRAZIL (1989). Also, for
am extensive view of military rule in Brazil see THOMAS E. SIUDMORE, THE POLI-
TICS OF MILITARY RuLE IN BRAZIL 1964-1985 (1988).
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thirty two million Brazilians who live in poverty. 183 If there is
not continued economic growth as there has been for the past
two years, Brazil's new democracy will falter and the military
could step in once again. An IMF plan that encompasses grad-
ual economic recovery and growth with reasonable long term
debt restructuring is a viable weapon against Brazil's continued
indebtedness. Presently, the IMF and Brazil are still negotiat-
ing the next round of debt restructuring and conditionality poli-
cies. Such an agreement will probably not be finalized until
after the Fall 1994 elections in Brazil since the lower middle
class and poverty line voters still react with great distaste to-
ward Brazilian politicians who negotiate with the IMF.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the IMF did not violate international law by under-
mining Brazil's sovereignty since the IMF abided by the Arti-
cles of Agreement.B4 and the Guidelines On Conditionality.'*5
Brazil's consent to the IMF austerity programs exhibits a cogni-
tive recognition on the part of Brazil that they accepted the con-
sequences of IMF conditionality. As a result, political-
economist Manuel Pastor, Jr., was incorrect about his asser-
tions that the IMF was violating international law. The IMF
should adopt a more balanced approach to its conditionality
measures. In order for the IMF to be an effective and legitimate
facilitator of Brazilian socio-economic growth, it must work
with the Brazilian government on a more equal basis than it
has since the 1980's.
Since the IMF is not unlike many other multilateral insti-
tutions, such as the World Bank and the United Nations, the
ability of the IMF to effectively find an equitable solution to
Brazil's foreign debt will affect all multilateral institutions' le-
gitimacy among the developing countries. Such pressing mat-
ters as the current IMF standby agreement negotiations with
Russia and the sub-Saharan African countries 186 could be de-
railed by the continued disgruntlement with the stringent IMF
183 Latin American Survey: Onwards and Downwards in Brazil, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 13th, 1993 at 21.
184 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 53.
185 GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY, supra note 166.
186 The Banker's Beanfeast, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1993, at 83-84.
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conditionality policies. This would be a significant loss for both
the developing and developed countries, since continued socio-
economic underdevelopment in Russia and in the sub-Saharan
African countries will lead to more political instability and ulti-
mately more civil discord. Indeed, continued political, eco-
nomic, and social unrest in Russia and sub-Saharan Africa is a
concern for the security of the entire world. If Brazil and other
indebted Third World countries continue to view themselves as
subordinates to the IMF, they will be less willing to work within
the framework of other multilateral institutions that are pri-
marily funded and managed by the industrialized nation-states
to promote world socio-economic growth and to settle interna-
tional disputes.
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